Why do not

Why Facts Don’t Change Our Minds

Among the many, many issues our forebears didn’t worry about were the deterrent effects of capital punishment and the ideal attributes of a firefighter. Nor did they have to contend with fabricated studies, or fake news, or Twitter. It’s no wonder, then, that today reason often seems to fail us. As Mercier and Sperber write, “This is one of many cases in which the environment changed too quickly for natural selection to catch up.”

Steven Sloman, a professor at Brown, and Philip Fernbach, a professor at the University of Colorado, are also cognitive scientists. They, too, believe sociability is the key to how the human mind functions or, perhaps more pertinently, malfunctions. They begin their book, “The Knowledge Illusion: Why We Never Think Alone” (Riverhead), with a look at toilets.

Virtually everyone in the United States, and indeed throughout the developed world, is familiar with toilets. A typical flush toilet has a ceramic bowl filled with water. When the handle is depressed, or the button pushed, the water—and everything that’s been deposited in it—gets sucked into a pipe and from there into the sewage system. But how does this actually happen?

In a study conducted at Yale, graduate students were asked to rate their understanding of everyday devices, including toilets, zippers, and cylinder locks. They were then asked to write detailed, step-by-step explanations of how the devices work, and to rate their understanding again. Apparently, the effort revealed to the students their own ignorance, because their self-assessments dropped. (Toilets, it turns out, are more complicated than they appear.)

Sloman and Fernbach see this effect, which they call the “illusion of explanatory depth,” just about everywhere. People believe that they know way more than they actually do. What allows us to persist in this belief is other people. In the case of my toilet, someone else designed it so that I can operate it easily. This is something humans are very good at. We’ve been relying on one another’s expertise ever since we figured out how to hunt together, which was probably a key development in our evolutionary history. So well do we collaborate, Sloman and Fernbach argue, that we can hardly tell where our own understanding ends and others’ begins.

“One implication of the naturalness with which we divide cognitive labor,” they write, is that there’s “no sharp boundary between one person’s ideas and knowledge” and “those of other members” of the group.

This borderlessness, or, if you prefer, confusion, is also crucial to what we consider progress. As people invented new tools for new ways of living, they simultaneously created new realms of ignorance; if everyone had insisted on, say, mastering the principles of metalworking before picking up a knife, the Bronze Age wouldn’t have amounted to much. When it comes to new technologies, incomplete understanding is empowering.

Where it gets us into trouble, according to Sloman and Fernbach, is in the political domain. It’s one thing for me to flush a toilet without knowing how it operates, and another for me to favor (or oppose) an immigration ban without knowing what I’m talking about. Sloman and Fernbach cite a survey conducted in 2014, not long after Russia annexed the Ukrainian territory of Crimea. Respondents were asked how they thought the U.S. should react, and also whether they could identify Ukraine on a map. The farther off base they were about the geography, the more likely they were to favor military intervention. (Respondents were so unsure of Ukraine’s location that the median guess was wrong by eighteen hundred miles, roughly the distance from Kiev to Madrid.)

Surveys on many other issues have yielded similarly dismaying results. “As a rule, strong feelings about issues do not emerge from deep understanding,” Sloman and Fernbach write. And here our dependence on other minds reinforces the problem. If your position on, say, the Affordable Care Act is baseless and I rely on it, then my opinion is also baseless. When I talk to Tom and he decides he agrees with me, his opinion is also baseless, but now that the three of us concur we feel that much more smug about our views. If we all now dismiss as unconvincing any information that contradicts our opinion, you get, well, the Trump Administration.

“This is how a community of knowledge can become dangerous,” Sloman and Fernbach observe. The two have performed their own version of the toilet experiment, substituting public policy for household gadgets. In a study conducted in 2012, they asked people for their stance on questions like: Should there be a single-payer health-care system? Or merit-based pay for teachers? Participants were asked to rate their positions depending on how strongly they agreed or disagreed with the proposals. Next, they were instructed to explain, in as much detail as they could, the impacts of implementing each one. Most people at this point ran into trouble. Asked once again to rate their views, they ratcheted down the intensity, so that they either agreed or disagreed less vehemently.

Sloman and Fernbach see in this result a little candle for a dark world. If we—or our friends or the pundits on CNN—spent less time pontificating and more trying to work through the implications of policy proposals, we’d realize how clueless we are and moderate our views. This, they write, “may be the only form of thinking that will shatter the illusion of explanatory depth and change people’s attitudes.”

One way to look at science is as a system that corrects for people’s natural inclinations. In a well-run laboratory, there’s no room for myside bias; the results have to be reproducible in other laboratories, by researchers who have no motive to confirm them. And this, it could be argued, is why the system has proved so successful. At any given moment, a field may be dominated by squabbles, but, in the end, the methodology prevails. Science moves forward, even as we remain stuck in place.

In “Denying to the Grave: Why We Ignore the Facts That Will Save Us” (Oxford), Jack Gorman, a psychiatrist, and his daughter, Sara Gorman, a public-health specialist, probe the gap between what science tells us and what we tell ourselves. Their concern is with those persistent beliefs which are not just demonstrably false but also potentially deadly, like the conviction that vaccines are hazardous. Of course, what’s hazardous is not being vaccinated; that’s why vaccines were created in the first place. “Immunization is one of the triumphs of modern medicine,” the Gormans note. But no matter how many scientific studies conclude that vaccines are safe, and that there’s no link between immunizations and autism, anti-vaxxers remain unmoved. (They can now count on their side—sort of—Donald Trump, who has said that, although he and his wife had their son, Barron, vaccinated, they refused to do so on the timetable recommended by pediatricians.)

The Gormans, too, argue that ways of thinking that now seem self-destructive must at some point have been adaptive. And they, too, dedicate many pages to confirmation bias, which, they claim, has a physiological component. They cite research suggesting that people experience genuine pleasure—a rush of dopamine—when processing information that supports their beliefs. “It feels good to ‘stick to our guns’ even if we are wrong,” they observe.

The Gormans don’t just want to catalogue the ways we go wrong; they want to correct for them. There must be some way, they maintain, to convince people that vaccines are good for kids, and handguns are dangerous. (Another widespread but statistically insupportable belief they’d like to discredit is that owning a gun makes you safer.) But here they encounter the very problems they have enumerated. Providing people with accurate information doesn’t seem to help; they simply discount it. Appealing to their emotions may work better, but doing so is obviously antithetical to the goal of promoting sound science. “The challenge that remains,” they write toward the end of their book, “is to figure out how to address the tendencies that lead to false scientific belief.”

“The Enigma of Reason,” “The Knowledge Illusion,” and “Denying to the Grave” were all written before the November election. And yet they anticipate Kellyanne Conway and the rise of “alternative facts. ” These days, it can feel as if the entire country has been given over to a vast psychological experiment being run either by no one or by Steve Bannon. Rational agents would be able to think their way to a solution. But, on this matter, the literature is not reassuring. ♦

"Don't" and "doesn't" | Britannica Dictionary

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Question

Difference between "Don't" and "doesn't"? — Jeanette

Answer

Jeanette has asked about the difference between don't and doesn't. These are negative forms of one of the most important verbs in English.

My colleague Kory Stamper, an editor of the Learner's Dictionary, responds:

Both don't and doesn't are contractions. Don't is a contraction of do not, while doesn't is a contraction of does not, and they both act as auxiliary verbs.

In English, don't is used when speaking in the first and second person plural and singular and the third person plural ("I," "you," "we," and "they"). It can be used to make a negative statement:

         I don't like seafood.
         You don't want to do that.
         We don't want to go home yet.
         They don't have to pay now.

It can also be used when asking a question:

You want to buy one, don't you?
Don't they want to go?

Doesn't, on the other hand, is used when speaking in the third person singular only ("he," "she," and "it"). Like don't, doesn't is used to make negative statements:

         He doesn't like me.
         She doesn't want to leave now.
         It doesn't look like he'll be able to make it.

And it is also used when asking a question:

Doesn't she like the play?
It looks like rain, doesn't it?

The big difference in use between don't and doesn't is that don't is also used to give commands (commands in English are always given in the second person singular or plural):

Don't touch the stove!

Doesn't cannot be used in giving commands.

Don't is occasionally used in American English speech and in historical writing as a contraction of does not (as in, "He don't know where he is going."), but this use is now considered improper and should be avoided. Remember that in modern speech and writing, don't cannot be used in the third person singular.

Why is there no consensus? Tel Aviv hosted a conference on the Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics — Trinity Variant — Nauka

On October 18-24, Tel Aviv University hosted the first international conference “The Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. The current state and relation to other interpretations. The conference was organized by the Center for Quantum Science and Technology of Tel Aviv University.

Faculty of Engineering building where conference 9 was held0002 About fifty scientists from thirteen countries, from Canada to Australia, came to Tel Aviv. More than thirty reports were read. Scientists who were unable to arrive for one reason or another sent their video messages, which were shown during the meetings. Very interesting discussions took place. Each of the six days of the conference was devoted to one of the problems associated with the Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI).

On the first day the ontological problems of many worlds were discussed. On the second day, the reports were devoted to the search for answers to the question: "What is "peace" in MMI?". The reports of the third day were related to the problem of probability in MMI. On the fourth day, scientists discussed many-world cosmology and problems related to cosmology. The fifth day is the problems of decoherence at MMI. And, finally, the sixth, final day was given to reports on interpretations of quantum mechanics, not related to MMI.

Lev Vaidman

The first speaker (after a welcoming speech from the leadership of Tel Aviv University) was Lev Vaidman , chairman of the organizing committee and organizer of the conference. In a 1993 article in the Review of the Modern Physics, Weidman (with Avshalom Elitzur ) proposed a thought experiment that aroused great interest among physicists. A year later, a Dutch group of physicists led by Paul Kvyat carried out this experiment, after which a research boom began in the physics of many worlds, which continues to this day. Many-worlds interpretation proposed by an American physicist by Hugh Everett in 1957, remained a marginal area of physics almost until the end of the 20th century, but is gradually gaining more recognition and becoming the physical mainstream today.

Avshalom Elitzur

However, despite numerous studies (so far only theoretical), there is no consensus among physicists regarding MMI, and not only Vaidman, but also other speakers spoke about why this happens. Guy Hertzoni (Israel) in his report cited the results of a recent survey of physicists: who adheres to which interpretation of quantum mechanics. To my surprise, it turned out that now there are more than twenty (!) Different interpretations, starting, of course, with Copenhagen. Most interpretations are supported by only a few people, and some interpretations are not supported by anyone other than the authors themselves. Naturally, the most popular was the Copenhagen interpretation, proposed by another Niels Bohr . This interpretation is shared by 48% of the surveyed physicists from different countries. David Bohm's interpretation of (with hidden parameters) is shared by 24%, and MMI is in third place with 18%.

Why do half of the physicists still adhere to the Copenhagen interpretation, despite the fact that it is self-contradictory? Weidman believes that this is not the fault of the MMI, but the psychology of physicists who do not want to part with the time-tested concept. The idea of Copernicus that it is not the Sun that revolves around the Earth, but the Earth revolves around the Sun, became generally recognized only a century and a half later, although the advantages of the Copernican interpretation were obvious.

The main message of Weidmann's report is that only the wave function exists in nature and nothing else. Unlike Bohr, who considered the wave function to be a mathematical abstraction that can be used to obtain real and accurate physical results, Everett and his followers believe that the wave function is not mathematics, but the most real physics. The existence of many worlds makes it possible to expel randomness and long-range action from quantum theory and from physics in general. MMI is a purely deterministic theory. The question becomes meaningless: with what probability will some event occur? It will come true without fail: if not in world A, then in world B or some other out of a huge number of them. Quantum mechanics ceases to be probabilistic.

During the discussion, Weidman was asked the question: How many branch worlds are there in the Multiverse? A huge but finite number, as Weidman argued, or an infinite number of worlds? Most of the physicists who participated in the discussion argued that there must be an infinite number of worlds, while Weidman defended the point of view that the number is very large (huge), but not infinite - for the simple reason that there are no infinite quantities in physics at all. In mathematics, yes, infinite quantities exist, but not in physical reality. The parties did not reach a consensus on this issue.

There was no consensus in many other interesting and heated discussions.

Among the forty reports there were very different ones - from purely physical, considering various, not yet investigated, aspects of the MMI ¹ , to philosophical questions - about the ontology of wave functions ( Per Arve , Norway) and even about what justice is in Multiverse ( David Papineu , England). After all, you may be disappointed that you drew a short “quantum straw” and ended up in a branch where you failed to become a favorite, you want to do otherwise, but if any of your choices is equally real, you cannot choose between a more probable branch and a less probable. Both are the same.

A different approach to a similar topic Adrian Kent (England) in the report "Many Worlds and the Limits of Science". Many worlds, Kent believes, presupposes the presence of unlucky branches, and the personality is in uncertainty about the world into which it has fallen. Will the person know that he has fallen into the "unlucky branch"?

Alyssa Ney

Zongao Liu (China) spoke about personal identification in the Multiverse. Is branching real at all, he asked, or do we only have a divergence of initially identical branches? According to him, personal identity relations in a possible universe w ₁ is the same as the personal identity relationship in the possible universe w if w and w ₁ are physically identical.

The paper by Alyssa Ney (USA) was devoted to the problem of locality in the metaphysics of many worlds. She considered the well-known EPR paradox using an example that at first glance looks simple and even trivial. Socrates was given a cup of hemlock, he drank the poison and died. His wife Xanthippe became a widow at the same time. But she was on the other side of the city, learned about the death of her husband after a while - and became a widow. So when did she become a widow? According to Alyssa Ney, the question is not at all as trivial as it seems ...

Nicholas Gisin (Switzerland) stated that MMI can be used not only in quantum but also in non-deterministic classical mechanics. With the use of deterministic mathematics, classical mechanics is also deterministic. But in intuitionistic mathematics, classical mechanics is non-deterministic. Intuitionistic numbers can be random, semi-random (such as the number π), etc. Classical real numbers are a kind of hidden variables of classical mechanics.

Nicholas Gysin Eric Curiel

Eric Curiel (Germany) with a group of physicists set up an experiment, trying to answer the question: is “our” space-time the same as multiple copies of space-times become after branching? Or is there only one space-time? What can be said about space-time after branching? Two experiments were carried out with microparticles (10 ^-11 g) in the Stern-Gerlach interferometer. The particle separation was 10 ^–4 see Curiel believes that in the decoherent branching pattern, splitting space-time geometries are supposedly effective descriptions emerging from some of the underlying structures of the quantum gravity world.

David Wallas

David Wallas (USA) states that there are three classes of real solutions to the observational problem: hidden variables (Bohm), dynamical collapse, and Everett branches. Empirically they are equivalent. Which theory is correct depends on the conclusiveness of the evidence. Most of even non-relativistic physics cannot be reproduced by any modification of quantum mechanics. All physicists know the adage addressed to the theorists of quantum mechanics: "Shut your mouth and count." In other words, there is no need to think about the deep essence of quantum physics. Quantum mechanics "works" perfectly, so do the calculations without delving into philosophy. According to Wallas, now this aphorism should sound differently: "Shut your mouth and use Everett's interpretation for calculations. "

Yakir Aharonov

On the last, sixth day of the conference, physicists spoke who considered other interpretations of quantum mechanics, except for the MMI. And the first to speak was the Israeli physicist Yakir Aharonov , who in 1959, together with David Bohm, predicted a physical effect called the Aharonov-Bohm effect. Aharonov, who turned 90 this year, continues to actively engage in physics. At the conference, he spoke, in particular, about his conversation with Niels Bohr, but devoted his speech to a description of the experiment, which MMI supporters explain by the presence of branching. According to Aaronov, this and similar experiments are explained by the interpretation, which is called not many worlds (many worlds), but many minds (many minds).

Don Page Andrew Jordan

It is impossible to tell about all the presentations in a short review, I will list only a few titles from which you can understand what the speakers were talking about:

Don Page (Canada), "Possibilities for probabilities";
Avshalom Elitzur (Israel-USA): “Do parallel worlds leave causal tracks in one another? (I don't think this is the end of physics)",
Tomasz Bigazh (Poland), Coherent Histories and Multiworld;
Samuel Kuipers (England), "Everett's related states in the Heisenberg picture";
Andrew Jordan (England), "Quantum erasure of the memory of Wigner's friend".

David Deutsch

The conference ended with a video presentation by David Deutsch (England), author of the famous books The Structure of Reality, The Beginning of Infinity, etc. Deutsch is one of the founders of quantum computing and cryptography and an active supporter of MMI. Deutsch was talking about exactly what Weidman was talking about at the beginning of the conference: why is there still no consensus among physicists about MMI?

“Lev Vaidman asked this question,” Deutsch said, “and I agree with his answer: the reason is in human psychology. There is no consensus, because there is no consensus among physicists and humanity in general in anything. Even the theory of relativity quite a lot of physicists continue to refute, despite the many proofs of its correctness. Historical experience speaks of constant contradictions - this is how science develops ... "

"There is no peace, we only dream of peace," Alexander Blok wrote. The same can be said about consensus in science.

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