What is the term for giving something human qualities

Types of philosophizing are characterized by three main stages in the development of philosophical thought:

1. Classical type of philosophizing.
2. Non-classical type of philosophizing.
3. Postclassical type of philosophizing.

The starting point in this series is the concept of classical philosophy (see Philosophy), since it is associated with ideas about the patterns of philosophizing, the corresponding names, personalities and texts, as well as about the patterns offered by philosophy to people as guidelines for their life and activity . From a historical point of view, each era presents its own philosophical patterns that retain cultural significance to the present. In this sense, we should talk about the philosophical classics of Antiquity, the Middle Ages and others. In a narrower view, philosophical classics can be limited to the 17th-19th centuries and in the main space of the European region, since it was in this chronotope that the idea of ​​classicism received a detailed justification and development. Such a narrowing of the "field" of philosophical classics makes the comparison of the classical, non-classical and post-classical more clear. Then the end of the classical stage is fixed in the middle of the 19th century, the non-classical stage - from K. Marx to E. Husserl - unfolds until the middle of the 20th century, and the postclassical stage takes shape and lasts in the second half of the 20th century with the prospect of continuing into the next century. At this stage, the “narrow” meaning of the classical is practically lost, because the inclusion of the classics in new methodological, cultural and practical contexts turns out to be significant.

The classical type of philosophizing presupposes the presence of a system of samples that determine the commensuration and understanding of the main aspects and spheres of being: nature, society, people's lives, their activities, knowledge, thinking. The corresponding mode of implementation of samples is also implied: their deduction, distribution, consolidation in specific forms of spiritual, theoretical, practical activity of people. So, for example, a generalized idea of ​​a person is included in specific descriptions of human individuals, explanations of their actions, assessments of their situations. In this model, the form of description and explanation is predetermined, and when it comes into contact with "human material", it singles out certain qualities in it and measures them. Accordingly, some qualities of people and things are not taken into account by the model, remain in the "shadow" or are simply cut off by it.

This aspect of the work of a generalized idea of ​​a person as a methodological model indicates its relationship with the canons of traditional common sense. Like traditional ideas about human nature, it can be broadcast as an unchanging scheme of experience from generation to generation, move in social time, maintain its continuity, serve as a means of reproduction and organization of social ties. But in one essential point it differs from traditional schemes: it is not "attached" to a certain zone of social space, it is no longer associated with the peculiarities and restrictions of the estate character. Here the historical background of his logical "insight" (and seeming universality) is revealed. By the very process of history, he is cut off from concrete soil; religious, legal, economic, technological, scientific changes, it is abstracted from the ethnic, social, cultural characteristics of human communities. This feature of the classical model is reinforced by its reliance (which is often just a reference) to scientific justifications. Classical philosophy uses the authority and arguments of science to give its models a special social significance. The similarity of these samples both with traditional canons and with scientific standards indicates that they “claim” for the very role that the traditional canons of behavior and thinking played. However, the displacement of traditional schemes and the occupation of their functional "cell" by samples is carried out by philosophy based on scientific standards and by comparing philosophical samples and scientific standards as tools of human activity.

The connection of classical philosophy with science (see Science) is primarily a connection with logic (see Logic), which initially developed as part of philosophy itself, and then worked within the framework of individual sciences, mainly natural sciences and mathematics. This is the logic that provides classifications of generalization, reduction, matching and measurement procedures. As for the generalization itself, in classical philosophy very sophisticated and methodologically promising concepts of deploying general concepts into specific characteristics of being were developed. It suffices to recall G. W. F. Hegel’s position on singularity as a true realization of the universal, his reasoning about individuality as the spiritual center of tribal life and its living concrete incarnation. But, firstly, Hegel himself formulated these provisions on the "margins" of his main works or in such a clearly non-methodological work as Aesthetics, and secondly, the attention of the reading public (and in this sense, society) was fixed on generalization as on the procedure of applying the pattern to different spheres of human existence, on the functioning of the pattern as a measure of various human manifestations and interactions. Eastern classics do not give examples of such a severe break of philosophy with the forms of everyday experience and, accordingly, such mutual influence of philosophy and science as European philosophy of the 19th century; the latter is especially important to understand. the soil on which 9 grows0264 postclassical philosophy.

The impact of science on the philosophy of the 19th century, on its models and on the methods of their use, was explicitly or implicitly corrected by the development of the economy, industry, technology. A special social significance was attached to the schemes of activity and thinking that served the expanding production, mass production of things devoid of individual characteristics. The stability of these schemes was given by the corresponding image of a person, which is quite consistent with the model present in the philosophical classics. The abstractness of the model stimulated the consideration of human subjects, their qualities and relationships through the summation, subtraction, multiplication and division of their forces. Moreover, these forces essentially turned out to be abstracted from their individualized carriers. In the generalized image of a person, not only the individual characteristics of people were lost, but also their own process of being, the dynamics of their self-change, self-realization. self-development.

The generalized image of a person as a measure of people's activity in the characteristics of human interactions revealed the significance of the norm. In fact, it was in this function that he was included in the legal and moral regulators of social relations (see Society). Its abstraction from the individual characteristics and processuality of people's lives created reliable conditions for measuring the behavior of people as abstract individuals. The abstractness of the model created opportunities for its use in assessing various human situations - no matter how far people go in their actions and misdeeds, a model (set of samples) for characterizing and evaluating their actions already existed. The generalized image of a person acted in philosophy and beyond in explicit or indirect coordination with the generalized images of nature, history, culture, activity, science, law, politics, and so on. All these concepts (and instruments of action) were formed according to the same type. Therefore, they constituted a coherent classical picture of the world and implemented the methodology corresponding to it, more precisely, they were clear and rather rigid means of its implementation.

In this sense, the samples of philosophical classics fully corresponded to the canons of classical aesthetics; they were quite clear, simple, stable in relation to individual originality and dynamics of natural phenomena and social life. Their stability is akin to the colonnade of a classical temple, setting the invariable order of passage of space, turning an ordinary walk of people into a cultural event, into a ritual or its imitation; wayward and assertive time thus acquired a canonical measure.

The seemingly natural stability of classical models (their totality) became one of the important prerequisites for their collapse, because it was precisely the impossibility of using the classical picture of the world in working with peculiar and dynamic systems that made people doubt its reliability, and then give it criticism and revision . However, the crisis of classical models that began in the second half of the 19th century revealed another important, previously hidden, feature: as their methodological limitations became clear, their role in the reproduction of cultural forms (see Culture), in the transmission of human experience through space and time. The collapse of exemplary classical forms was not only a crisis in the knowledge of nature and man, it threatened the existence of fundamental structures for storing and transmitting human experience. Classical models revealed their significance as forms of social reproduction and their inability to continue to live up to this purpose.

Non-classical philosophizing is not a direction, it is a type of thinking and action associated with a reaction to classical models, with the crisis of the classics and its overcoming. This is a reaction to the disproportion between the abstract subject of classics and concrete individuals, the abstract object - the evolution of nature, its methodology - the search for resources of intensive activity in all areas of practice.

The situation, which is commonly called non-classical , is not at first revealed in philosophy or philosophy; it finds itself on the borders of philosophy and science, when classical theories of knowledge collide with objects that do not "fit" into the usual cognitive forms. At the end of the 19th century, such objects are perceived as exceptions to the rules, as exotic representatives of micro- and mega-worlds, however, the number of such objects is steadily increasing, and one has to put up with the fact that quite recently "simple and clear nature" (which should be "imitated" ) surrounds a person with an intricacies of unobservable and clearly not fixed objects. Moreover, by the middle of the 20th century, it turns out that society, the system of people's life with its conditions, means, products, also belongs to the world of non-classical objects, cannot be reduced to things, to tools, mechanisms, machines that work with things. The classical attitude towards stable natural and mental patterns and the positivist orientation towards the "logic of things" that followed it in this regard turn out to be untenable.

The non-classical situation grew from the periphery - that is, from the boundaries outlined by the problems of science and practice - to the center, that is, to the concentration of worldview and methodological forms concentrated "around" classical philosophical samples. The stability of patterns seemed to be the last stronghold of culture, and therefore of science, and morality, and, in general, a normally functioning sociality.

Tradition firmly linked the existence of patterns with their inviolability and immutability. Therefore, the threat to their stationary state was almost always perceived as a threat to their destruction. But it was precisely the regime of stationary existence of samples that came to an end. And the point is not even that they have been subjected to more and more massive criticism from different positions and points of view. The fact is that mastering a non-classical situation became possible only if the mode of their work changed. This condition, however, under the pressure of a powerful critical mass, was noticeably simplified and interpreted in terms of the rejection of samples as methodological and worldview norms. Classical models, having lost their privileged position, moved to the position of ordinary means of human activity; they came at the complete disposal of those individual subjects whose behavior they had previously regulated and directed. The generalized image of a person, previously placed above the concrete being of people, turned into one of the methodological forms for solving some particular problems of cognition and practice. Now separate subjects, independently determining behavioral guidelines, modeling various interactions, adapted classical schemes to the implementation of their individual projects.

As the field of action of classical models was reduced, the zone of manifestation of human subjectivity became wider and wider. Subjectivity was freed from epistemological assessments that brought it closer to distorted knowledge, and revealed ontological aspects of the life and actions of human individuals. This shift in the manifestations of human subjectivity was initially recorded by psychological research. Psychology actually "rehabilitated" subjectivity and at the same time itself shifted the focus of interests from the characteristics of a person's cognitive capabilities to the interpretation of the emotional-volitional and non-rational spheres of his being.

In terms of cultural and philosophical change in the status of subjectivity for a long time (until the middle of the 20th century) was assessed in accordance with classical models, that is, negatively - as the onset of subjectivism, irrationalism, nihilism. In this regard, the space of culture also seemed to be more and more fragmented , losing its stable dimensions and correspondences. From this point of view, the field of society was seen as a set of interactions of different subjects, kept from complete arbitrariness only by rigid structures of sociality.

From about the second quarter of the 20th century, the question of subjectivity enters into "resonance" with the problem of finding the actual human resources for the development of society. The extensive path, in principle, turns out to be a dead end; the productivity of the economy, the prospects of technology, the renewal of science and culture turn out to be dependent on the energy and quality of the activity of individual subjects. The problem of subjectivity is gradually turning into the problem of the subjectivity of individuals as a force and form of development of sociality. Individuals "enter" the consideration of this problem first as carriers of physical and nervous energy, that is, mainly as natural bodily objects equated with other resources of social reproduction. But this move does not promise qualitative changes. There is a need to include individuals in economic, technological, managerial schemes and chains in all possible fullness of their social subjectivity, that is, with all their possibilities of self-realization and productive interaction. There is a tendency to identify and combine models that individuals operate in the organization of their acts and contacts, models implemented in the means and results of activity, in other words, models, ontologized in the practice of people turning into elements of the structures of social life.

The field of sociality appears to be divided among many subjects, and these are no longer individual subjects with their psychologized subjectivity, but "composite" - group subjects, for example, subjects realizing their images of the world, their models of activity. These are subjects that accumulate the energy and organization of social communities, branches of activity, cognitive disciplines, use their means and resources, affirm their subjectivity and egoism. In the limit, these are social machines that not only occupy important positions in social space, but also reproduce this space, ontologize their models and tools, form the objectivity of social life and the types of behavior of the people themselves.

This production, in fact, turns out to be an ontologization of models embodied in schemes and technologies. The space of society is gradually filled with such ontologized models. From a point of view that accepts the usual logic of things, there seems to be nothing strange in this. However, the fact of the matter is that such modeling of being comes into conflict with the logic of things, since it replaces with one-sided schemes (and their ontologizations) the own being of natural objects with their inherent rhythms and laws. This essentially gives rise to, and then makes more and more threatening the environmental problem and a number of other problems of modern society associated with the huge social inertia of extensive types of activity. The problem arises not only of limiting this type of activity, but also of coordinating different models of the world, determining the mode of their interaction, the needs and conditions for their processing.

The theme of the interaction of different models that shape the positions and behavior of social subjects grows out of the theme of their collision. Conflict situations just reveal the fact that subjects have different images of the world and models of activity. The crisis forms of relations between people and natural systems in a certain sense speak of the same thing: the ways people act are not commensurate with the ways - which can be interpreted as a kind of "model" - of the reproduction of natural complexes. This is how a group of methodological tasks is revealed to identify models, their deontologization, limitation and processing. And above all, this is task de-automation of models that "reborn" into large-scale production, management structures, institutionalized forms of scientific activity, "capturing" huge natural and human resources into the orbit of their functioning.

The solution of these problems involves the choice of a strategy aimed at removing ontologized models from the automatic mode of operation, determining their boundaries and capabilities; their adjustment or processing according to results under control for people. However, this kind of strategy is not immediately formulated, in fact, it - as a reasonable and detailed concept - does not exist until now. It "hints" at its still latent existence as a set of scientific and methodological, philosophical, ideological, socio-political movements that manifested themselves in various spheres of public life, but united by the type of tasks being solved. Moreover, in the course of the solution, the necessary means are divided and become independent goals: one group of movements insists on the dismantling of automated models up to their liquidation; the other is on the construction of new interaction models that correspond to the context of their use, the capabilities of the human individuals controlling them. For the first - and these include supporters of methodological and ethical anarchism, extreme deconstructivism and postmodernism, as well as the most aggressive representatives of ecological and cultural-religious anti-modernism - it is important to show the repressive function of the models, the social and technological forms they masked, to make the very process of them " disassembly" means of liberation of the multidimensional existence of people, things and texts. For the second - they include supporters of the concept of "small science", phenomenological and microsociology, ethnomethodology, social history, developmental upbringing and education, unifying (ecumenical) religious trends - the fundamental question is about formation and reproduction normative and regulatory models by specific social subjects in certain spatial and temporal conditions, about the forms of fixing the socio-spatial and temporal organization in the interactions of the people themselves.

In various variations, the implementation of these goals leads to the gradual formation of the principle that characterizes this type of task. It can be called the "principle of the other." “Other” turns out to be a conventional designation of that potentially multidimensional object, according to the standards of which models of interaction of people with each other and with natural systems are built. This principle points to a paradoxical task: to form interaction according to the standards of an object, the measures of which are not fixed, that is, the measures of an object do not depend on the subject, but on the way the object exists, its state, the specific nature of the interaction.

In the classical situation, when the privileges of objectivity (and objectivity) were emphasized in every way, its significance, the need to reckon with it and comply with it, the measure-creating function essentially remained completely in the hands of the subject. In a postclassical situation, when the image of an object seems to be completely lost, it is the way of being of the object (objects) that becomes the most important factor in determining the models that build interaction with it. Accounting for this factor turns out to be an essential moment in the reproduction of the subject itself, its preservation and construction. The subject in this situation can be neither abstract nor "monolithic": its identity is confirmed by the constantly renewed ability to develop and reproduce interaction models.

The image of the “other” is at first anthropomorphic and personological: models of interaction with the “other” are therefore characterized in accordance with ideas about interpersonal communication between people; it is enough to recall the first attempts to substantiate the methodology of humanitarian knowledge, the "sciences of the spirit", the procedure of understanding (W. Dilthey). But the continuation of these attempts gradually leads to the conviction that in order to understand another, personal sympathy, co-understanding, co-action is not enough: this is the task, and this is its difficulty, that it is necessary to go beyond the existing personal, subjective, subjective representations and concepts, transform and reformulate them in order to determine a productive order of interaction.

For philosophy (and for everyday consciousness), understanding this situation is given with great difficulty. First of all, apparently, because it is necessary to overcome not so much logical and methodological difficulties as difficulties of a moral and psychological nature: in fact, it is necessary to make the practice of going beyond the boundaries of ordinary ideas and concepts, beyond the limits of personal experience, beyond the limits of individual subjectivity. Overcoming these personal-psychological barriers, which were hidden in the philosophical and methodological work, actually means the onset of the post-classical stage and the formation of the post-classical type of philosophizing.

The difficulties and complexities of this transitive situation, of course, are expressed primarily through reactions that fix the insufficiency of individual psychological forms for the work of a philosophizing subject. Therefore, the interpretation of overcoming these forms often develops into theses about the destruction or annihilation of the subject, about the disappearance of the author, about the dehumanization of philosophy, and so on. Similarly, the multidimensionality of the “other”, the “non-classical” nature of objects and the ways of fixing them give rise to the ideas of the decay of objectivity and the destruction of reality. But reactions are followed by a stage of awareness of difficulties methodological work associated with the construction of a new form of subjectivity, with the definition of the mode of functioning of interaction schemes, with the technique of reconstructing object situations and forms of their development. In philosophy, there are still many barriers to the transition to this kind of activity: one of them is the orientation of the philosophy of the 20th century to the microanalysis of interactions, in which subject-subject relations (and contacts with the “other”) are modeled in the spirit of disciplinary-psychological, microsociological, linguistic schemes .

The logic of philosophy's transition to the postclassical stage and type of work is determined not only by philosophy, but by the "internal plots" of its evolution over the past century and a half. Important incentives are provided by the development of such scientific areas as evolutionary universalism, biology and physiology of activity, synergetics, and the world-system approach. In this sense, we can say that N. Moiseev, L. von Bertalanffy, I. Prigogine, F. Braudel, I. Wallerstein and some other researchers did no less than famous philosophers of the second half of the 20th century to form the style of postclassical philosophizing. Their efforts are associated with a number of practical environmental, political, economic, technical and scientific problems that clearly indicate the need for the formation of samples , and most importantly, the creation of modes of operation of samples that ensure the co-existence of social systems and their co-existence with natural systems.

The problem of samples returns to philosophy, but it returns as a setting for changing philosophy itself, for the formation of philosophical concepts of the formation and functioning of samples , the corresponding structuring of sociality, subjects of interactions, schemes for the self-development of human individuals. A feature of this regime is the combination of the stability of samples as norms with their functions of regulators that ensure co-change and self-change of human subjects.

The dynamics of samples and their stable functioning is, in fact, the task, on the specific solution of which other interpretations of traditional philosophical concepts and procedures depend: subject, object, measure, measurement system, generalization, concretization - all of them are rediscovered "from outside" their formation, in the aspect of interaction, in terms of self-change of social subjects. Thus, the concept of the general is less and less interpreted as the result of abstraction from individual subjects; more significant is its function of the result of the interaction of specific subjects and the scheme of their co-change. In this aspect, it indicates a form that balances the processes of being of various subjects, systems, objects, a dynamic form, becoming and changing. Such a form naturally turns out to be an element of social ties, ensures the reproducibility of social space, but obviously does not coincide with the standards of other systems of being "drawn" by a person into his activity.

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